According to research from the London School of Economics, in Venezuela's Orinoco Mining Arc (OMA), the armed forces – tasked with state security – are actively involved in illegal mining operations. Established to promote mining development, the OMA granted special powers to the military, including control over security zones directly administered by the Ministry of Defence. Rather than curbing violence, this militarisation has entrenched criminality, with state agents allegedly collaborating with local sindicatos (criminal gangs) and Colombian armed groups. Military personnel reportedly sell fuel to these groups, operate checkpoints along illicit transport routes to extort bribes in cash and gold, and facilitate the smuggling of minerals by enabling clandestine flights out of the country. These operations suggest a systematic pattern of corruption and complicity, though rather than one centralised structure, multiple military factions and individuals appear to engage in and profit from different aspects of the illegal mining economy.

In 2019, it was estimated that 45% of miners in Venezuela’s Bolívar State were underage and extremely vulnerable to labour exploitation. Children are especially at risk of being trafficked in the area, as they are often unaccompanied, and those as young as nine have been found working in mines, exposing themselves to polluting and toxic substances and dangerous working conditions. They are also sometimes used by the criminal groups operating illegal mines as watchmen or informants.

According to investigations from the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), BBC Panorama, Premières Ligners, and Global Witness culminating in a report in 2020, the Dubai gold dealer Kaloti Jewellery bought precious metals from sellers accused of laundering money for drug traffickers and criminal groups. It was also accused of purchasing Sudanese conflict gold in 2012. Between 2007 and 2016, more than US$9.3 billion worth of Kaloti transactions were flagged in suspicious activity reports.  In 2013, auditors from EY and Deutsche Bank (where Kaloti held accounts), identified suspicious activity indicative of Money Laundering. Whistleblowers from both firms reported being ostracised as a result of raising the alarm on Kaloti, and the EY partner leading the investigation later sued EY for covering up the company’s failings and pushing him out of the firm. The London High Court awarded him US$11 million – a decision that EY is appealing.  Following reports of Kaloti’s suspicious behaviour, the US Treasury commenced an investigation into its financial transactions and email communications. Between 2013 and 2016, four major banks closed accounts associated with Kaloti. However, the Treasury ultimately closed the case without charges or a designation of Kaloti as a Money Laundering threat.

In December 2024, a significant case of cross-border illegal mining was reported in South Sudan's Greater Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA). According to Chief Administrator Gola Boyoi Gola, more than 50 unauthorised Ethiopian mining companies had established operations in the Raad area of Jebel Boma County, encroaching approximately 15km into South Sudanese territory. These companies, equipped with earth-moving machinery, were extracting gold from the resource-rich region without proper licences or environmental oversight. The illegal mining operations had severe environmental consequences, particularly through the use of mercury in gold extraction processes. Chief Administrator Gola reported that mercury contamination had polluted the Akobo River, which flows through both countries, resulting in human fatalities and killing fish and wildlife. Despite repeated appeals from local authorities, the national government of South Sudan had not mounted an effective response to the encroachment as of December 2024.

In Sudan, Yevgeny Prigozhin's Wagner Group (now known as the Africa Corps) established an elaborate gold extraction network through Meroe Gold Limited – a company under Prigozhin's M Invest umbrella – that systematically circumvented normal mining regulations through a meticulously documented arrangement with Sudan's military intelligence apparatus. Leaked internal contracts revealed that M Invest paid Aswar Multi Activities Co. (operated by Sudanese military intelligence) US$100,000 monthly plus a US$200,000 upfront "goodwill fee" and US$500 per Russian personnel brought into Sudan, with Aswar providing weapons, equipment, and military transport in return. The partnership yielded extraordinary privileges – including permission for Meroe's aircraft to fly under military signal codes to avoid commercial tracking, access to military bases, and most critically, an unprecedented presidential directive in August 2018 ordering the Ministry of Minerals to waive the government's mandatory 30% stake in gold operations specifically for Meroe. This arrangement continued even after President Bashir's 2019 ouster, with documents showing Sudan Mineral Trading (SMT) – a company owned by the Sudanese military – acting as an intermediary to transfer additional gold rights to Wagner's operations while legal experts within Sudan's own Ministry of Minerals raised objections that were subsequently overridden. When US sanctions targeted Meroe Gold in July 2020, the operation simply transferred its mining waste treatment facility to Al Sawlaj for Mining Ltd., a shell company with a single employee (a former Meroe manager) that government sources confirmed was merely a new front for Wagner's continued extraction of Sudanese gold to finance Russian war efforts.

In September 2022, the municipality of Tampakan in South Cotabato, Philippines, made a decisive regulatory intervention by revoking the business permit of Sagittarius Mines, Inc. (SMI), the operator of Southeast Asia’s largest undeveloped copper-gold deposit. The revocation, announced by Mayor Leonard Escobillo, was based on findings that SMI had misrepresented its business classification, falsely registering as a mineral exploration manufacturer while operating as a general engineering contractor – an act deemed fraudulent under the Municipal Tax Code of 2012. The local government, through a routine audit, discovered the discrepancy and subsequently padlocked SMI’s facility in the village of Liberty. Despite the company’s separate legal challenge against a _397 million (US$6.9 million) tax liability, officials emphasized that the permit revocation was purely regulatory and unrelated to the tax dispute.

In El-Ebeidiya, northern Sudan, artisanal gold mining has created an acute environmental and public health emergency, where geologist Mohamed Abdelrahman documented miners using approximately 5.6 tons of mercury daily, with around 1,500 pounds washing into the surrounding environment each day from poorly managed tailings. A comprehensive 2021 study by Al Neelain University's Salih Ali Salih revealed devastating consequences: along a mere 40-mile stretch between Atbara and El-Ebeidiya, researchers identified approximately 700 waste heaps containing an estimated 450,000 tons of mercury-contaminated tailings, with 20% of these toxic piles located within 150 feet of residential homes. The contamination has infiltrated local water supplies, with testing confirming high mercury levels in one-fifth of drinking water samples, over a quarter of urine samples, and 7% of blood samples – predominantly from young children. Local communities report alarming health impacts, including increased miscarriages, paralysis, and blindness, while the situation has been dramatically worsened by the August 2023 flash floods that submerged hundreds of villages and mines across northern Sudan, washing concentrated toxic chemicals directly into drinking water and irrigation sources that serve the region's most vulnerable communities, creating what climate activist Nisreen Elsaim described as "a huge disaster" that compounds the humanitarian crisis in a country where warring military factions – notably the RSF under General Hemedti – actively encourage and profit from unregulated mining to finance their ongoing conflict.

Between January and March 2024, a catastrophic incident at the Naknak mining site in Greater Kapoeta in South Sudan highlighted the extreme dangers faced by unregulated artisanal miners when seven individuals perished after being trapped underground during a sudden rainstorm. The miners, lacking proper temporary shelters or safety protocols, sought refuge inside deep excavation holes as the rain began. Unaware of conditions on the surface, they were caught off guard when the nearby river flooded from its mountain source, rapidly filling their makeshift shelters – six miners drowned and another succumbed to injuries after reaching the surface, with only one survivor. This tragedy exemplifies how the absence of regulatory oversight, safety standards, and proper infrastructure in South Sudan's gold mining sector creates life-threatening conditions, especially for the estimated 60,000 artisanal miners operating across more than 70 concessions in the region, where basic safety measures and early warning systems for environmental hazards remain virtually non-existent.

According to reports from the Enough Project, high-ranking politically exposed persons (PEPs) from both Juba and the Kapoeta region have established small-scale mining operations using large detection machines in direct violation of the 2012 Mining Act. These officials deploy South Sudan People's Defense Forces (SSPDF) or National Security Service (NSS) soldiers to secure their mining sites against competitors while simultaneously monitoring foreign miners' activities in the region. According to local business sources, the monthly cash flows for some of these political-military leaders can reach US$2 million. By utilising government vehicles and personnel for their private mining activities, these officials avoid security, transportation, and wage costs that would otherwise cut into profits, allowing them to pocket proceeds without remitting the government's share of revenue – creating a system where the very officials tasked with enforcing mining regulations are systematically undermining them for personal gain.

The collapse of the Blyvooruitzicht Gold Mine in 2013, once a major producer west of Johannesburg, is illustrative of South Africa's broader mining crisis, where environmental, health, and social consequences are left unaddressed. After liquidation due to falling gold prices and labour unrest, the two final operators, DRDGOLD and Village Main Reef, each denied responsibility for rehabilitation, leaving behind toxic tailings, radioactive waste, and a lawless zone overrun by illegal miners. Around 11,000 residents now live amid contaminated air and water, frequent gunfire, and severe health risks, with only US$3 million allocated for cleanup – far below the estimated need. Acid mine drainage, dust storms carrying heavy metals, and radioactive soil in informal settlements like Tudor Shaft have created lasting public health threats, while government efforts to rehabilitate abandoned mines remain drastically underfunded and slow.

Across the world, women engage in mining and many other types of mining-related work, including working as laundresses, cooks or vendors, especially in illicit mining camps (and sometimes under conditions imposed by criminal groups that control the area and/or run the mining operations). Sometimes, they are deceived about the nature of work and working conditions and are instead trafficked into prostitution. In addition to organised sexual exploitation and trafficking in mining camps, illicit mining has been linked to sexual violence towards local women. For example, in August 2022, 12 women were reportedly raped by illegal miners in the Krugersdorp region of South Africa, with over 80 illegal miners arrested by law enforcement in connection with the incident.

In 2023, South Africa’s mining industry came under sharp scrutiny after Corruption Watch, a national anti-corruption watchdog, revealed that a staggering 38% of the 2,110 corruption complaints it received that year were related to mining – a significant jump from less than 25% in 2022. This dramatic increase signals a rising tide of public discontent and whistleblower activity in a sector long fraught with governance and compliance issues. With approximately 800 mining-related reports submitted by whistleblowers, concerns emerged that internal whistleblowing systems are either ineffective or distrusted, pushing employees to bypass internal channels in favour of external watchdogs.

In South Africa, mining communities are flourishing inside disused gold mines. Many of these illegal gold miners were previously employed by large mining firms and spend months at a time underground. While they can earn huge profits, the work is also dangerous – and occasionally fatal. Furthermore, there is significant involvement from criminal gangs, which provide weaponry to protect the miners from other gangs, or assist the miners by acquiring food and supplies while they are underground. Many miners have turned to these practices in response to high unemployment rates and poverty and are often extorted by the criminal gangs that run these underground mining communities. Authorities are increasingly cracking down on these underground communities, citing armed gang involvement and lost tax revenue. In attempts to drive out the miners, police have, in some cases, prevented food and water from being lowered into the mining shafts. However, some have argued that harsh crackdowns are an inappropriate response to illegal mining in South Africa, advocating instead for decriminalisation and regulation.

In December 2023, Sierra Leonean authorities arrested two Chinese nationals and one Sierra Leonean in Darakuru Village, Koinadugu District, for engaging in illegal gold mining without the mandatory Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) License, violating Section 24(1) of the 2022 Environment Protection Agency’s Act. Investigations revealed that the suspects had been conducting unauthorised mining activities for several months. They were subsequently handed over to the Criminal Investigations Department at Mena Police Station in Makeni for further inquiry.

Rwanda plays a central role in the laundering of conflict gold originating from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Gold mined in conflict-affected areas such as Walikale and Ituri is controlled by a mix of armed groups and corrupt military officers. Instead of being processed through legal Congolese export channels, large volumes of this gold are smuggled across the border into Rwanda. Once in Rwanda, the gold is laundered by being officially exported under Rwandan certification, obscuring its Congolese origin. In particular, Aldango Ltd, a gold refinery operating in Kigali’s Special Economic Zone, has been accused by regional monitoring groups of processing significant amounts of undocumented gold likely sourced from eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Corruption occurs on a large scale in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s cobalt industry, resulting in the continual siphoning of revenue from the country to foreign companies. Glencore, the Swiss mining conglomerate, was convicted of paying at least US$27.5 million in bribes to gain business advantages in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. As revealed in the Paradise Papers, Glencore engaged Israeli businessman Dan Gertler (now sanctioned by the US for corruption) to secure a substantial discount for its forthcoming purchase of Katanga Mining, a state-owned cobalt and copper mining company. Gertler, known for his close ties to Democratic Republic of the Congo President Joseph Kabila through previous dealings in weapons and diamonds, received a conditional US$45 million loan from Glencore. In return, he negotiated a price reduction for Katanga Mining from US$585 million to US$140 million. In 2022, Glencore was ordered to pay US$180 million to the Democratic Republic of the Congo authorities after being convicted of corruption, and in 2024, it was fined an extra US$152 million by Swiss authorities for failing to prevent a business partner from bribing a Congolese public official in 2011.

In 2023, the M23 rebel group (which has been accused of receiving support from Rwanda, including weapons and logistical aid) in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo took control of the Rubaya coltan mine – one of the most important sources of tantalum globally – and began extracting and taxing the mineral to fund their operations. According to The Wall Street Journal, the group earns as much as US$300,000 a month by extorting money from miners and transporters. The coltan is then smuggled across the border into Rwanda, where it is laundered into the legal supply chain by falsely certifying it as Rwandan origin and “conflict-free.” This practice of coltan smuggling is well documented – for example, in one incident in March 2021, a truck crossing the border from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Rwanda was found to be carrying 24 sacks of smuggled coltan.

In June 2021, Rwandan authorities arrested two individuals in Rulindo District for conducting illegal coltan mining operations and exploiting Child Labour (Article 6 of the law regulating to Labour in Rwanda prohibits subjecting a child below the age of 18 to any form of work which is physically harmful to the child). The suspects had coerced 32 minors (who were rescued during the operation), aged between 12 and 16, to abandon their education and work in hazardous mining conditions. These children were paid between 7,000 and 8,000 Rwandan francs per kg of coltan extracted. The operation was uncovered following complaints from local residents about the destruction of their fields due to unauthorised mining activities. Subsequently, the arrested individuals were charged under laws prohibiting Child Labour and unauthorised mineral exploitation.

In June 2022, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, G7 countries including the UK, Canada, US, and Japan introduced new sanctions banning the import of Russian gold, which is Russia’s biggest non-energy export. According to the UK government, Russian oligarchs had rushed to buy gold bullion in an attempt to avoid the financial impact of western sanctions. Given London’s status as a global gold trading hub, these actions aimed to significantly impact Putin’s ability to raise funds and shut Russian gold out of formal international markets.

In March 2024, a catastrophic rockslide at the Pioneer gold mine in Russia’s Amur region left 13 workers trapped 120 metres underground, sparking a desperate two-week-long rescue operation marked by extreme geological and logistical challenges. Despite the deployment of specialised teams and equipment from Siberia’s Kuzbas region, efforts were hampered by massive rubble volumes – ultimately found to be nine times higher than initially estimated – and rising water levels that flooded caverns that miners were sheltering in. Hopes were temporarily raised when reports emerged of tapping noises from within the mine, but the absence of confirmed contact, coupled with increasing risks of secondary collapses, forced authorities to call off the operation in April. The disaster prompted an official investigation into safety violations, with the mine's managing director arrested amidst mounting scrutiny of systemic lapses in industrial safety across the country.

In June 2023, the US Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned four companies and one individual connected to the Russian Wagner Group's (now Africa Corps) exploitation of gold resources to fund its global mercenary operations. A key target was Midas Ressources SARLU, a Central African Republic (CAR)-based mining company that controlled the Ndassima gold mine containing reserves valued at over one billion dollars, which Wagner forces protected from CAR government inspection while reportedly collaborating with local rebel groups in violation of CAR mining regulations and UN sanctions. The sanctions also targeted Diamville SAU, a gold and diamond purchasing company in CAR controlled by Wagner founder Yevgeniy Prigozhin, along with its partners Industrial Resources General Trading in Dubai and OOO DM in Russia, which together operated a sophisticated scheme to convert CAR-origin gold into US dollars and physically transport cash to Russia following sanctions on Russian financial institutions. This case highlights how illegal mining operations can serve as financing vehicles for transnational criminal organisations and armed groups, with gold being particularly valuable due to its portability, value retention, and the difficulty in tracing its origins – challenges that prompted multiple US government agencies to simultaneously issue an advisory on the gold sector across sub-Saharan Africa, warning of risks related to conflict financing, Money Laundering, Sanctions Evasion, Human Rights Violations, and environmental degradation associated with such illicit operations.

The Wagner Group is a Russian private military company that plays a significant role in illegal mining activities in Africa, particularly as part of Russia’s broader strategy to exert influence and secure economic resources in resource-rich, politically unstable regions. The group's involvement in illegal mining operations is intertwined with its global financial networks, which are reportedly linked to conflict financing. As of 2024, the Wagner Group in Africa has been taken over by the Africa Corps, a Russian mercenary group controlled by the Russian government.  A 2023 report from US think tank 21 Democracy estimates that Russia, through the Wagner Group and subsequent Africa Corps, has earned more than US$2.5 billion from African gold since February 2022. The US has sanctioned the group for its exploitation of natural resources in countries such as the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali that create a revenue stream for conflicts across the region, as well as the Russian-Ukraine war.  In the CAR, Wagner’s forces have been accused of using violence to secure control of mining areas, displacing local communities and exploiting workers. The group also has a reportedly sophisticated smuggling network to move illegally mined resources, particularly gold and diamonds, out of Africa and into the global market. These practices also often violate international sanctions, like restrictions against the Wagner Group by countries such as the US and UK, highlighting the linkages between illegal mining, Sanctions Evasion, and conflict financing.

The Tampakan copper-gold mining project in the Philippines has experienced fluctuating support and opposition since its mineral reserves were discovered in the 1990s, revealing deep tensions between industrial development and environmental and social justice. Local opposition, led by the Catholic Church, environmental coalitions like the Tampakan Forum, and Indigenous groups, has centered on the threat the open-pit mine poses to watersheds, forests, and the ancestral domain of the Blaan people. Despite securing national-level regulatory wins – such as the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples' certification of Indigenous consent in 2020 and a short-lived lifting of the mining ban in 2022 – the project continues to face strong local resistance. The case exemplifies the volatile interface of local autonomy, Indigenous rights, environmental stewardship, and corporate interest in large-scale resource extraction in the Philippines.

In 2020, an illegal gold mining operation was discovered on the ancestral lands of the Obo Monuvu Indigenous people (commonly called Manobo) within the protected Mount Apo area in Mindanao, Philippines. Tribal chief Joel Buntal reported that "The operator did not seek permission from the tribal council to mine the area. They conducted their operations during the nighttime." According to Manobo leader Era España, previous illegal small-scale mining operations had encroached on ancestral lands around Mount Apo because "the tribe allowed them" without following the legally required Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) process. This bypassing of proper procedures undermined Indigenous governance systems and created community divisions. The illegal mine consisted of a 5 metre tunnel with approximately 25 sacks of ore (each containing about 90kg). One Child Labourer interviewed by Mongabay described carrying four 10kg sacks of ore daily from the mining tunnel to waiting trucks, traversing rivers and navigating steep, slippery slopes. The children were promised 5 pesos per kg (potentially earning about US$4 per day) but ultimately weren't paid for their work. This wage theft prompted the children to report the operation to authorities, which led to the exposure and subsequent shutdown of the illegal mining operation, according to tribal council member Benjamin Bugcal.

In Paracale, a small rural town in the central Philippines with abundant gold deposits, the health consequences of illegal gold mining practices have devastated local communities. Despite the Philippines government banning mercury use in small goldmines in 2012, miners continue using this toxic element to extract gold from ore, creating severe health hazards. Residents first noticed "mysterious illnesses" affecting their lungs before environmental organisation Ban Toxics discovered mercury levels so high their instruments couldn't measure them. The Guardian highlights one case in which Shirley Suzara, vice-president of a local mining association, lost her cousin – a miner in his 40s – to lung disease after suffering debilitating headaches and repeated hospitalisations, leaving behind his wife and nine children. Studies confirm that even minimal mercury exposure can severely damage the central nervous system, causing immediate symptoms like hair loss, tremors, and impaired vision, while chronic exposure leads to lung disease, paralysis, and birth defects. With approximately 15 million people worldwide working in small-scale gold mines and four out of five residents in towns like Paracale depending on gold for income, these health impacts represent an ongoing crisis affecting generations of mining communities.